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ABSTRACT 
China remains the single largest producer of pirated and counterfeit 
goods in the world.  The purpose of this article is to explore the 
different factors that have impeded effective trademark protection in 
China.  In particular, this article analyzes the cultural barriers between 
the United States and China, and in doing so, helps one understand the 
climate of hostility between the two nations when it comes to trademark 
enforcement.  This article further analyzes the constant pressure 
exercised by the United States against China, which has led to the 
adoption of trademark laws by the Chinese government at the national 
and international level but has proven to be ineffective in the short-run.  
This article also provides an overview of Chinese history and culture to 
establish the foundation upon which the present trademark legal system 
was built, and to explain how these cultural mores are inconsistent with 
intellectual property rights as perceived under Western culture.  Finally, 
this article explores an alternative to the coercive approach adopted by 
the United States to protect trademark owners in China.  It is based 
upon the EU-China model which promotes leniency, understanding, 
and cooperation in the long-run. 
INTRODUCTION 
Business entities and individuals have a legitimate interest in 
protecting their trademarks abroad.2  However, when it comes to 
protecting their trademark(s) in China, the international community has 
voiced some deep concern about China’s dedication and ability to 
provide protection.3  Indeed, China is viewed as the single largest 
producer of pirated and counterfeit goods in the world.4  This harsh 
critique of China’s inability to protect trademark and intellectual 
property rights (“IPR”) in general is widely spread in the West.5  While 
China is undertaking a historic and unprecedented advancement in the 
 
2.  See Scott A. McKenzie, Comment, Global Protection of Trademark Intellectual 
Property Rights: A Comparison of Infringement and Remedies Available in China versus the 
European Union, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 529, 531 (1998-1999). 
3.  Wei Shi & Robert Weatherley, Harmony or Coercion? China-EU Trade Dispute 
Involving Intellectual Property Enforcement, 25 WIS. INT’ L. L.J. 439, 442 (2007). 
4.  Anne M. Wall, Symposium: National Sports Law Institute of Advisors: Intellectual 
Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 
342 (2006); see Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2008 Special 301 at p. 19, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (last visited 
March 5, 2011)  [hereinafter “USTR”]. 
5.  Robert H. Hu, International Legal Protection of Trademarks in China, 13 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 69, 76 (2009). 
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legal protection of trademarks, ongoing debates have raged on between 
the West and China.6  The West, led by the United States, continues to 
assert that China has done poorly in protecting foreign trademarks.7  
Trademark piracy in China is still rampant and continues to cost foreign 
trademark owners billions of dollars in lost sales and jobs.8  
Consequently, the United States’ constant frustration with China’s 
failure to protect and enforce trademark and IPR in general in China 
has led the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to place China on the 
Priority Foreign Country Watch List for epidemic infringements of IPR 
more than once.9  Each year on the last day of April, the USTR’s Office 
issues the Special 301 Report that places countries on a priority foreign 
country list.10  Many American businesses that recommended that China 
be put on the priority watch list in the next Special 301 Report on April, 
30 2010,11 have been heard as China remains on the priority watch list in 
2010.12  As of today, China continues to be the most notorious and 
singled-out country for piracy and counterfeiting practices.13 
Conversely, China justifiably claims that it has made substantial 
strides in establishing a modern trademark system within a short period 
of time.  Such action demonstrates China’s commitment to fight 
intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting within its borders.  To 
further demonstrate its commitment, China actively engaged on the 
international platform, signed several international treaties and 
conventions, and acceded to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 
2001.14  Following its accession to the WTO, China has complied with 
 
6.  Id. at 74. 
7.  Id. 
8.  The U.S. Secretary of State, Carlos Guttierez stated that the theft of IP in China 
was costing U.S. businesses an estimated $2.3 billion a year and called on China to strengthen 
its fight against “rampant counterfeiting.” 
9.  USTR, supra note 4, at 19.  
10.  Id. 
11. Amy Tsui, China Remains Top IPR Priority for Many Business Group Say at 
Special 301 Hearing, Mar. 12, 2010, available at 
http://news.bna.com/ptln/PTLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=16408158&vname=ptcjnotallissu
es&fn=16408158&jd=a0c2g1x5r1&split=0. 
12.  2010 Special Report, 19 (April 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906 (holding that despite the positive steps China took in 
2009 with respect to IPR enforcement, the overall IPR theft in China remains 
“unacceptable”).  
13.  Donald P. Harris, Nineteenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Article: The 
Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM 
INT’ L. L.J. 96, 102 (2009). 
14.  See Info, Office of the State Council, New Progress in China’s Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Part. III (1994), available at http://china.org.cn/e-
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the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS).15  Thus, China leaves no doubt as to its commitment to 
becoming a competitive, “innovation-oriented” country that should 
command international respect regarding IPR protection.16 
Yet, China’s efforts in adhering to its domestic and international 
duties have not substantially reduced the problem of IPR piracy and 
trademark infringement in China.17  At the national level, despite 
adequately implemented resources, including anti-piracy campaigns and 
an increasing number of IPR cases brought before Chinese courts, 
overall levels of piracy, counterfeiting, and trademark infringement 
remained unacceptably high in 2007.18  Similarly, at the international 
level, although China’s legislation has been in accordance with 
international standards, enforcement under the TRIPs Agreement 
remains mediocre.19  TRIPS is viewed as the “benchmark” for gauging 
the adequacy of China’s trademark laws because it sets the standard for 
international IPR protection.20  According to the 2008 USTR Report, 
inadequate IPR enforcement is a key factor contributing to these 
shortcomings.21  Thus, the West, especially the United States, continues 
to claim that legislation without enforcement in China is “elusive and 
deceptive, as are rights without remedy.”22 
Trademark enforcement in China remains poor.  However, critics of 
the Chinese trademark regime and its enforcement seem to disregard 
the influence of culture on China’s current efforts to enforce trademark 
infringement within its borders.23  Indeed, Confucianism, and later on 
Communism, did not ratify the idea of providing property-like 
protection to products of the individual intellect.24  This explains why 
 
white/intellectual/index.htm  [hereinafter “Office of the State Council”]. 
15.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 440. 
16.  Wall, supra note 4, at 354. 
17.  Hu, supra note 5, at 82. 
18.  USTR, supra note 4, 20. 
19.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 443. 
20.  See TERENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY 2249 (1986-1994) (introducing TRIPs as the cornerstone of the 
global IPR regime). 
21.  USTR, supra note 4, at 2. 
22.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 443. 
23.  Dexin Tian, The Chinese Cultural Perceptions of Innovation, Fair Use, and the 
Public Domain: A Grass-Roots Approach to Studying the U.S.-China Copyright Disputes 
(2008), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Tian%20Dexin.pdf?bgsu1224963994. 
24.  John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Towards 
Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’ L ECON. L. 735, 786-87 
(1999). 
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protection of trademarks in China depends not only on the study of 
existing laws but on an understanding of China’s history and culture.  As 
China is gradually changing its economic system into a market-based 
model,25  new concepts of private property and individual rights have 
emerged.  China has realized that the recognition of private rights has 
become a requisite to attract and protect foreign investments. 
However, China’s problems in enforcing the rights of trademark 
owners will not be remedied by the recourse to coercion that the United 
States exercises against it.  Instead, coercion will merely exacerbate 
China’s reluctance to respond to the United States’ pressure.  Thus, it is 
imperative for the United States to understand China’s cultural and 
socio-economic powers.  Such understanding will help the United States 
comprehend the problems China faces in enforcing trademarks within 
its borders.  Well aware that it was in its best interest to pursue the 
“understanding” approach rather than the “coercive” approach, the 
European Union (“EU”) has managed to establish a relationship with 
China that is mainly based on trust and harmony.  Thus, while the 
United States has yet to learn the lesson that coercion will not resolve 
issues of trademark enforcement in China, it should exercise the 
“understanding” approach by adopting the EU-China model, which 
rests upon harmony, understanding, and cooperation. 
The purpose of this article is to explore the different factors that 
have impeded effective trademark protection throughout Chinese 
history.  In particular, this article analyzes the cultural barriers between 
the United States and China, and in doing so, helps one understand the 
climate of hostility between the two nations when it comes to trademark 
enforcement.  This article further analyzes the constant pressure 
exercised by the United States against China that has led to the 
adoption of trademark laws by the Chinese government but has proven 
to be ineffective on the short-run. 
Part I of this article addresses the development of intellectual 
property in China and the implementation of trademark laws, as well as 
China’s accession to various international treaties and convention in 
response to the overwhelming pressure from the United States. 
Part II of this article provides an overview of Chinese history and 
culture to establish the foundation upon which the present trademark 
legal system was built, and to explain how these cultural mores are 
inconsistent with intellectual property rights as perceived by Western 
 
25.  Naigen Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New 
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5-6 (1997). 
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culture. 
Finally, Part III of this article explores an alternative to the coercive 
approach adopted by the United States to protect trademark owners in 
China.  It is based upon the EU-China model that promotes leniency, 
understanding, and cooperation in the long-run. 
I. CHINA RESPONDS TO FOREIGN PRESSURE AND OVERHAULS ITS 
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM TO PROTECT TRADEMARK RIGHTS 
Despite its worldwide reputation for trademark infringement, China 
has made considerable strides in entering and gaining acceptance from 
the international intellectual property community.26  Now that China is 
gradually changing its economic system into a competitive market-based 
model, it has come to realize that it is crucial to protect the exclusive 
rights of domestic and foreign trademark owners.27 
The 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China28 does not 
specifically provide protection for trademarks.29  The Chinese 
government implemented the Trademark Law in 1982.30  Current laws 
within the People’s Republic of China have been promulgated to 
protect intellectual property rights.31  In addition, bilateral treaties and 
international trade agreements currently afford trademark protection.32  
Together, they form the legal foundation upon which trademark owners 
may be protected in China.33 
 
26.  McKenzie, supra note 2, at 552. 
27.  Zhang, supra note 25, at 5-6. 
28. Chinese Constitution, adopted on December 4, 1982, available at 
http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm.  The 1983 Constitution is currently valid 
even though it was amended in 1988 and 1993.  
29.  See id. 
30.  Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, State Intellectual Property 
Office of P.R.C. Oct. 27, 2001, available at  
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws11.htm [hereinafter “Trademark Law”].  The 
1982 Trademark Law was adopted before the 1982 Constitution was ratified by the National 
People’s Congress.  Adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth 
National People’s Congress on 23 August 1982, revised for the first time according to the 
Decision of the Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China 
adopted at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s 
Congress on 22 February 1993, and revised for the second time according to the Decision on 
the Amendment of the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China adopted at the 
24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 27 
October 2001. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id.  
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A. Trademark Rights Protection in China: Awareness of the Risk 
Several attempts to promulgate regulations governing trademark 
rights were made in the 1950s and 1960s.34  However, the old trademark 
system played a very limited role in the protection of trademark 
holders’ rights.35  Indeed, there was virtually no incentive to infringe 
trademarks in the centralized planning economy because Chinese 
producers were not concerned as to whether their products could be 
sold; their only concern was to follow government planning.36 
China has been experiencing an unprecedented transformation of its 
trademark and legal systems to protect trademarks.37  To respond to a 
rapid economic development that started to attract foreign businesses, 
and partly because of pressure exercised by the U.S., China has taken 
major steps to provide trademark protection.  First, China realized that 
its economy had to modernize by embracing market-based principles 
already in place in the West.38  Otherwise, China knew it would face the 
risk of an economic “dysfunction” of disastrous magnitude.39  Second, 
the Chinese government implemented a body of law for the creation of 
a market economy, both as an end in itself and as an attraction for 
additional foreign investments.40  Third and lastly, China began major 
initiatives to improve its overall system of higher education, with greater 
emphasis on education in science, technology, and law.41  As a result, in 
1977 China launched an economic reform that mainly overhauled its 
national legal system, including intellectual property law.42  This marked 
the point at which China openly acknowledged the need to protect the 
rights of trademark owners as a means to attract foreign investments.43 
Trademark protection in China is currently afforded, under the 
Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China,44 upon issuance of a 
Certificate of Registration.45  It is worth noting that trademark owners 
who have not registered their trademark may still seek protection under 
certain provisions of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of 
 
34.  Hu, supra note 5, at 73. 
35.  Zhang, supra note 25, at 5. 
36.  Id.  
37.  Hu, supra note 5, at 71. 
38.  Allison & Lin, supra note 24, at 786-87. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. at 787. 
42.  McKenzie, supra note 2, at 553. 
43.  Id. at 552. 
44.  See Trademark Law, supra note 30. 
45.  See id. 
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China46 or the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Provision of Intellectual Property Crime).47  Another type of trademark 
protection that is afforded under Chinese law is the Law Against Unfair 
Competition of the People’s Republic of China.48  Unfair competition is 
defined as activities that might damage the legal rights and interests of 
others and “disturb the order of [the] social economy.”49  The Law 
Against Unfair Competition prohibits the misappropriation of trade 
secrets and provides holders of well-known marks anti-dilution 
protection—like protection for loss of good will.50 
However, trademark owners should not underestimate the benefits 
of the registration process in China.  Indeed, as opposed to the first-to-
use principle that is applied in the United States for registration of a 
mark, Chinese trademark law follows the first-to-file principle.  This 
fundamental difference has caught many foreign trademark owners by 
surprise.51  U.S. trademark owners are familiar with the U.S. principle 
where trademark rights extend back to the date of first use, or to the 
date of filing the registration subject to later use of the mark.  Thus, in 
the U.S., an unregistered trademark user may still establish protected 
trademark ownership rights under common law if it can prove prior use 
relative to a junior user.  Conversely, in China, the exclusive right to use 
a registered trademark in commerce extends to the owner of record 
according to the earliest date of filing, or other priority filing recognized 
 
46.  Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, State Intellectual Property Office 
of P.R.C., available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws10.htm (last visited 
March 5, 2011).  Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 
March 15, 1999. 
47.  Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (Provisions of Intellectual 
Property Crime), available at 
http://english.customs.gov.cn/Default.aspx?TabID=4712&InfoID=7897&ctl=InfoDetail&mid
=12908&ContainerType=G&default&ContainerSrc=notitle.ascx (last visited March 5, 2011) 
[hereinafter “Criminal Law”].  Adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress on July 1, 1979, and amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress on March 4, 1997. 
48.  Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, State 
Intellectual Property Office of P.R.C., available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/ 
(last visited February 23, 2010).  Adopted at the Third Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Eighth National People’s Congress on September 2, 1993.  Promulgated by Order No. 10 
of the President of the People’s Republic of China on September 2, 1993 and Effectives of 
December 1, 1993. 
49.  Jeffrey F. Levine, Meeting the Challenges of International Brand Expansion in 
Professional Sports: Intellectual Property Right Enforcement in China through Treaties, 
Chinese Law and Cultural Mechanisms, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 203, 222 (2007). 
50.  Id.  
51.  Wall, supra note 4, at 372. 
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elsewhere.52  Thus, unlike in the U.S., trademark owners need not 
submit evidence of use of the mark at either the application or 
registration stage.53  To their own detriment, many U.S. trademark 
owners have already entered Chinese commerce without prior 
registration of their trademarks with the Trademark Office when they 
soon discovered that their trademark has been infringed. 
Authors have disagreed as to the benefits and burdens of the first-to-
file principle currently in place in China.  Because U.S. trademark 
owners can register their marks in China before actually using them, 
they can benefit from the protection of their marks before they incur 
substantial capital expenses of actually selling and distributing 
trademarked goods, or providing services associated with those marks, 
in China.54  However, it is not unlikely that the U.S. trademark is already 
registered in China by a third party, possibly a competitor.55  Thus, 
trademark owners should be cautioned to register their trademark in 
China before considering doing business there. 
Moving on to the registration process, as previously stated, the first 
step to the protection and enforcement of trademarks in China requires 
that trademarks be registered in China.  In China, the term “trademark” 
is defined as “any visual sign capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one natural person, legal entity or any other organization 
from that of others, including any word, design, letters of an alphabet, 
numerals, three-dimensional symbol, combinations of colours, and their 
combination[s].”56  Moreover, trademarks, service marks, collective 
marks, and certification marks are recognized under Chinese law.57 
Application for registration of trademarks, service marks, and trade 
dress are handled through the Trademark Office under the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”).58  Under the State 
Council, the Trademark Office of the SAIC oversees registration and 
 
52.  Id.  
53.  Frank X. Curci, Symposium: Transnational Business in the Twenty-First Century: 
Protecting Your Intellectual Property Rights Overseas, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW 15, 16 (2002). 
54.  Id. at 17. 
55.  Id. 
56.  See Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 8; see Protect Your Intellectual Property 
Rights in China, Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., May 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/docs/businessguides/intellectualpropertyrights.htm. 
57.  Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 3. 
58.  See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, International Trade, Protecting Your Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) in China: A Practical Guide for U.S. Companies, available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/china/IPRNEW.htm (last visited March 1, 2010) [hereinafter “IPR 
Toolkit”].  
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administration of trademarks throughout the country.59  The SAIC has 
three responsibilities: (1) processing trademark registration applications 
and deciding on approvals in accordance with the law; (2) supervising 
the use of trademark and deciding on the revocation of registered 
trademarks; and (3) recording licensing contracts for the use of 
registered trademarks.60 
The Trademark Office accepts applications directly from individuals 
and legal entities through state-designated agents and also through 
procedures established under international treaties or agreements such 
as the Madrid Protocol.61  If the applicant is a foreign entity without a 
direct presence in China, the applicant must use a certified state-
designated agent to apply for the registration.62  Once the application is 
received with payment of the fees, it must pass the preliminary approval 
examination.  Once it passes such examination, the application is 
published for opposition.  The time allocated to oppose the application 
is three months from the day of publication.  The applicant may apply 
before the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board (TRAB) for 
review of the opposition.63  If there is no opposition, the mark will 
proceed to registration and a certificate of trademark registration will be 
issued.  A mark may be refused for registration on several grounds, 
including whether the mark is (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) 
geographically descriptive, (4) in conflict with an existing registration, 
(5) confusedly similar to the flags, emblems or name of China, foreign 
countries, or international governmental organizations, (6) harmful to 
socialist morals and customs, or (7) otherwise considered obnoxious.  In 
the case of a rejection, the applicant has fifteen days to appeal to the 
Trademark Review and Adjudication Board.64 
Once the trademark registration process has been completed and a 
Certificate of Registration issued, the registration must be recorded with 
the General Administration of Customs (“GAC”).65  Recordation 
enables the GAC to ban counterfeit goods at the border.66  Thus, 
without it, the GAC has no authority to stop infringing goods at the 
 
59.  Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 2. 
60.  See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58. 
61.  See infra note 77. 
62.  See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58.  
63.  See Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 33. 
64.  Id. at art. 32. 
65.  General Administration of Customs, Customs Recordation and Enforcement 
procedures, available at http://english.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal191/ (last visited March 1, 
2010). 
66.  See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58. 
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Chinese border.67  Once the recordation is granted, it is valid for a term 
of ten years and renewable thereafter.68  The registrant can enjoy the 
exclusive right to use its trademarks, which are now protected under 
China’s laws.69 
Finally, foreign trademark owners should consider filing separate 
registrations in all available transliterations and translations of the mark 
in Chinese characters, letters, and numerals within each class of trade in 
which the trademark will be used to secure the highest level of 
protection for their trademarks.70  Thus, foreign trademark owners 
should register their trademark in China before doing business there to 
avoid any undesired and harmful results that can directly affect their 
entire business. 
China’s commitment to protect trademarks in China has not been 
limited to the adoption of domestic laws under domestic registration.  
Indeed, China has joined in or signed six multilateral conventions, 
treaties, and agreements.71  Consequently, trademark owners may obtain 
an international registration in addition to the Chinese registration.  
Chinese legal scholars generally concede that treaties and agreements 
once adopted or acceded by China become sources of China’s domestic 
law and achieve the full force and effect of binding legal rules.72  This is 
supported by the General Principles of the Civil Law, which provides 
that international treaties and agreements supersede domestic law.73 
In 1985, China became a member of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (“Paris Convention”),74 which 
protects industrial property in the widest sense, including inventions, 
marks, industrial designs, utility models, trade names, geographical 
indications, and the repression of unfair completion.75  To comply with 
 
67.  Id.  
68.  Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 30. 
69.  Id. at art. 3.   
70.  Wall, supra note 4, at 374. 
71.  See Office of the State Council, supra note 14.  
72.  See ALBERT HY CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 103 (1992). 
73.  See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Rep. of China, art. 142, 
available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited March 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter “General Principles of Civil Law”]. 
74.  China became a member of the Paris Convention in March 19, 1985.  Contracting 
Parties to the Paris Convention, World Intellectual Property Organization, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited February 
28, 2010). 
75.  Convention of Paris, signed in Paris on March 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available 
at http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary-paris.html. 
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the Paris Convention’s requirements for the registration of “service 
marks” and the recognition of “well-known marks” in foreign 
countries,76 China adopted the 2001 Trademark Law and later passed 
the Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known 
Marks in 2003.77  Moreover, China became a member of the Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)78 
and entered into the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks.79  The purpose of the Madrid Agreement is to 
facilitate the acquisition of protection for marks among member states.  
Thus, the owner of a trademark that is registered in its country of origin 
may file for an international registration through the WIPO.80  Once 
approved, the mark will be deemed registered and protected in all of the 
member states’ territories.  To comply with the Agreement, the State 
Administration for Industry & Commerce of China issued the Policy for 
Implementation of International Registration of Marks in June 2003.81 
On December 1, 1995, China became a state party to the Protocol 
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks (“Madrid Protocol”).82  The Madrid Protocol is 
an international system for the registration of marks that addresses 
shortcomings identified within the registration system established under 
the Madrid Agreement.83  For instance, an eighteen-month period 
 
76.  Hu, supra note 5, at 85. 
77.  Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks (issued by 
the State Admin. for Industry & Commerce on April 17, 2003), available at 
http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/show.asp?id=57&bm=flfg. 
78.  China became a contracting party of the WIPO Convention on June 3, 1980.  
Contracting parties to WIPO Convention, World Intellectual Property Organization, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treatyid=1 (last visited 
February 28, 2010). 
79.  China became a contracting party on October 4, 1989.  Contracting parties to the 
Madrid Agreement, World Intellectual Property Organization, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/showresults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=21 (last visited February 
28, 2010).  
80.  Madrid Agreement, arts. 3, 7, 8; see World Intellectual Property Org., Protocol 
Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 
27, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-41, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/madrid/trtdocs_wo032.html  [hereinafter “Madrid 
Protocol”]. 
81.  State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Policy for the Implementation of 
International Registration of Marks under Madrid Agreement (Apr. 17, 2003), available at 
htpp://www.mlipa.com/2/fl/14.doc.  
82.  Contracting Parties to the Madrid Protocol, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/showresults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=8 (last visited February 
28, 2010); see Madrid Protocol, supra note 80. 
83.  Edwin E. Wallis III, The Madrid Protocol: Will This International System Succeed 
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instead of twelve months is allowed for state refusal to registration and a 
longer period for opposition by a third party.84  Also, a failed 
international registration can be transformed into a national application 
in each designated country, with the filing date and priority date of the 
respective international registration.85 
Finally, China acceded to the World Trade Organization in 
December 2001 and signed the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.86  Once again, China amended its 
then-existing trademark law and regulations under Article 13 of the 
2001 Trademark Law concerning recognition and protection of well-
known marks to comply with Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
By making consistent efforts to follow through on its bilateral treaty 
obligations and domestic laws, the Chinese government has 
undoubtedly shown that it is committed to protecting foreign 
trademarks and IPR in general.  China has shown that, within a short 
period of time, it has established an impressive system to address 
trademark protection.  “As [many] Chinese legal scholars have correctly 
observed, ‘In the process of implementing international treaties, China 
has demonstrated the credibility of a responsible super nation.’”87  First, 
China replaced its laws to respond to its rapid economic growth while 
addressing the major concerns expressed by the West, especially the 
United States.88  Indeed, China has passed new laws, re-promulgated 
Trademark Law to now include trademark service protection, and kept 
amending them to provide a new force.89  Second, China has adopted all 
major international treaties and agreements concerning trademarks that 
are in existence today.  China’s involvement in the international 
platform is important because under Chinese legal principles, 
international rules will prevail over domestic laws when there is a 
conflict between Chinese domestic law and the international norms.90  
 
in the United States?, 2004 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004). 
84.  Madrid Protocol, supra note 80, at art. 5. 
85.  Id. at art. 9quinquies. 
86. World Trade Organization, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited March 1, 2010). 
87.  Hu, supra note 5, at 118. 
88.  Paul B. Birden Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18 
LOY. L.A. INT’ L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 432 (1996). 
89.  Id. 
90.  See General Principles of Civil Law, supra note 73, at art. 142; Civil Procedure 
Law, art. 238, available at http://lehmmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/civil-
proceedings/law-of-civil-procedure-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1991.htm; 
Administrative Procedure Law, art. 72, available at 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2695 (last visited March 5, 2011). 
HOOVER - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:04 PM 
338  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
Third, under the action of the Trademark Office, the Chinese 
government has set up detailed rules and procedures for handling 
international trademark applications for registration submitted under 
the Madrid Union.91  Fourth, China created the China Intellectual 
Property Training Center in 1997 to train professionals on intellectual 
property matters.92  Even more telling, in 1992, China launched its own 
internal crackdown on counterfeit goods.93  Thus, overall, it may be fair 
to say that China’s new trademark laws provide a viable framework for 
the protection of most trademarks within the PRC.94 
B. Trademark Law Enforcement in China: Myth or Reality? 
China’s unprecedented transformation of its trademark regime and 
legal system to protect trademark owners did not stop there.  Indeed, 
China has also changed its judicial system to provide a means of 
enforcement95 by engaging its courts actively in enforcing trademark 
laws and adjudicating trademark and other IPR disputes and 
infringement cases.96  Special intellectual property tribunals have been 
set up within the People’s Court to hear intellectual property cases.  For 
instance, in June 1993, China founded the Beijing Intermediate People’s 
Court Intellectual Property Rights Tribunal under the Beijing 
Intermediate People’s Court.97  Since the creation of these specialized 
courts, there has been a high increase in the number of intellectual 
property cases.98  For instance, from 1998 to 2004, courts throughout the 
country concluded 38,228 IPR-related civil cases of first instance and 
2,057 criminal cases of first instance involving IPR infringement in 
accordance with Section Seven, Chapter III of the “Specific Provisions” 
of the “Criminal Law,” handing down sentences to 2,375 criminals.99  In 
 
91.  See Measures for the Implementation of Madrid International Registration of 
Trademarks (issued by the State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003, effective 
June 1, 2003), available at http://en.cnci.gov.cn/Law/LawDetails.aspx?ID=6759 (last visited 
March 5, 2011). 
92.  China Intellectual Property Training Center is the first national training center 
dedicated to providing education on intellectual property issues and practice. SIPO, Annual 
Report, Ch. IX, section 2, Training, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English//laws/annualreports/ndbg2003/200804/t20080416_380253.
html (last visited March 5, 2011). 
93.  Birden, supra note 88, at 432; see Millions of Fake Goods Uncovered, Destroyed, 
China Daily (N. Am. Ed.), Nov. 17, 1992, art. 1. 
94.  McKenzie, supra note 2, at 553. 
95.  Id. at 554. 
96.  Hu, supra note 5, at 72. 
97.  Birden, supra note 88, at 481. 
98.  McKenzie, supra note 2, at 554. 
99.    See IPR Toolkit, supra note 58. 
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2004 alone, 8,332 civil IPR-related cases of first instance and 385 
criminal cases of first instance involving IPR infringement were 
concluded, and 528 criminals were punished.100  As more and more 
Chinese companies and individuals are becoming aware of their 
trademark rights, they are more willing to go to court to protect them.101 
To enforce the protection of their exclusive right to use a registered 
mark in China, foreign and domestic trademark owners have three 
different channels under the Chinese legal code: (1) administrative 
enforcement, (2) civil enforcement, and (3) criminal enforcement.  
Trademark owners generally prefer to opt for a civil proceeding over an 
administrative action because they can obtain a preliminary injunction 
from the People’s Court before or at the time a suit is filed.102  
Furthermore, civil cases are generally handled within six months from 
the filing date, with an additional three months for an appeal.103 
Finally, trademark infringement can also be criminally prosecuted 
under China’s Criminal Code.  Because criminal prosecution is viewed 
as a greater deterrent, many trademark owners have elected it over the 
administrative and civil actions.104  Indeed, it is a crime to use another 
party’s registered trademark intentionally, sell merchandise under a 
fake trademark, and manufacture any representation of a registered 
mark without authorization from the registered owner.105  To respond 
against regionalism and corruption, China has stiffened the penalties for 
counterfeiting trademarks.  For instance, criminal penalties for 
trademark infringement may result in imprisonment for up to three 
years, and in cases where the violation was intentional, up to seven 
years.106  However, despite the threat of incarceration for trademark 
infringement, fines cannot exceed twenty-percent of the “illegal 
business or twice the profit earned by the infringement.”107 
To further demonstrate China’s commitment to fight trademark 
infringement and bring support to trademark owners, the Chinese 
 
100.  Id. 
101.  See Office of the State Council, supra note 14.  
102.  See Trademark Law, supra note 30, at art. 57. 
103.  He Zhonglin, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Law in Post-WTO China, 
BCLA Seminar, July 25, 2002, available at http://chinaiprlaw.com/english/forum/forum40.htm. 
104.  Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting 
Their Well-Known Trademarks in China, 31 BROOK. J. INT’ L L. 937, 968 (2006). 
105.  Criminal Law, supra note 47, at arts. 213-15.  
106.  Id. 
107.  Angela Mia Beam, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, 4 J. INT’ L. 
L. & PRAC. 335, 347 (1995)(quoting Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the 
Patent Law, 14 J. INT’ L. L. & BUS. 15, 15 (1993)). 
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government, through its Supreme People’s Court, released the 
“Interpretation by the [Supreme People’s Court] in Handling Criminal 
Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property” in 2004.108  Chinese legislators 
also amended the Criminal Law with Supplementary Provisions 
Concerning the Punishment of Crimes of Counterfeiting Registered 
Trademarks, which became effective in 1993.  Thus, China has once 
again proved its willingness and determination to protect trademarks 
within its borders. 
Yet, China remains under scrutiny and criticism for its poor 
enforcement of trademark laws.  Today, the greatest area of concern for 
the international community is not so much the adoption of new laws 
and the change of a judicial system for the protection of foreign and 
domestic trademark owners;109 instead, it is the actual enforcement of 
these new laws that raise concern.110  China continues to face epidemic 
trademark infringement despite constant international threats.111  The 
question remains as to what extent China’s trademark laws and IP 
system in general is effective in protecting foreign trademarks. 
Various factors may explain why a high number of trademark 
infringement cases are never reported to authorities.112  More often than 
not, Chinese companies elect to resolve the dispute in a private setting 
to preserve relationships and save face, following past custom.113  
Furthermore, decentralization has contributed to the erosion of 
Beijing’s control, the growth of regionalism and corruption, and the 
remarkable rise in power of local officials.114  “Although Beijing has 
identified localism as a priority concern, it remains a major obstacle to 
the enforcement of [trademark] laws in China.”115  Indeed, “the legal 
fragmentation between the central government and administrative 
 
108.  Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s 
Procura-torate on Several Issues of Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal 
Cases of Infringing Intellectual Property (Adopted at the 1331st Session of the Judicial 
Comm. of the Supreme People’s Ct., Nov. 2, 2004, and the 28th Session of the Tenth 
Procuratorial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Nov. 11, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 
2004), available at http://www.colaw.cn/findlaw/ip/infringing.htm (last visited March 5, 2011). 
109.  Doris Estelle Long, Article: The Protection of Information Technology in a 
Culturally Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 158 
(1996). 
110.  Id. 
111.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 445. 
112.  Wall, supra note 4, at 377-78. 
113.  Id. at 362. 
114.  See McKenzie, supra note 2, at 561. 
115.  Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to 
Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18 (1996). 
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agencies makes it difficult to discern which authority will handle a 
particular issue, or how one would have the authority to impose the rule 
of law at all.”116  Moreover, as the Chinese governmental structure is 
dominated by local power, the application of international treaties 
remains difficult to enforce.117  “Beijing’s ability to enforce its 
intellectual property regulations is seriously hampered by local 
resistance to change, particularly when local authorities sense that such 
change will take power out of their hands.”118  Not surprisingly, 
administrative agencies face powerful local officials, including military 
officials, who benefit directly from piracy.  Despite China’s pressure on 
local governments to implement and enforce trademark laws, the level 
of trademark infringement remains high, particularly in smaller towns 
where factories generate the mass production of counterfeit goods.119  
Thus, because local businesses generate substantial sources of local 
revenue, officials are unwilling to enforce trademark laws against them.  
Some scholars have denounced the voluntary “resistance” of local 
governments in enforcing the laws120 because they often seek to protect 
factories engaged in piracy that are beneficial to the area’s economy.121  
Many trademark owners may fear retaliation in the form of potential 
loss of market share if they file a complaint against a state-owned 
business as “state-owned enterprises still control the most important 
resources—especially capital.”122 
According to the 2008 USTR Special Report (“Special Report”), 
 
116.  Ryan P. Johnson, Steal this Note: Proactive Intellectual Property Protection in the 
People’s Republic of China, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1005, 1025 (2006). 
117.  PETER K. YU, Intellectual Property, Economic Development and the China 
Puzzle in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: 
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 
153, 174. 
118.  Aileen M. McGill, “How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic Trademark and 
Why This Success May not Generate Immediate Improvements in Intellectual Property 
Protection in China” LOY. LAW & TECH. ANN. (2010), available at  
http://works.bepress.com/aileen_mcgill/2/ (quoting Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: 
Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China in Practising Law Institute, Intellectual 
Property Aspects of Doing Business in China: Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook 
Series 111, 118 (Oct. 2007)). 
119.  Id. at 14.  
120.  See ROBERT KLITGAARD et al., CORRUPTED CITIES: A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO CURE AND PREVENTION, 17-22. 
121.  Amanda S. Reid, Case Notes and Comments: Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Developing Countries: China as a Case Study, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 
& POL’Y 63, 92-93 (2003). 
122.  Wu Jinglian, The road ahead for Capitalism in China, THE MCKINSEY Q. 2006 
SPECIAL EDITION: SERVING THE NEW CHINESE CONSUMER (June 2006), at 118, available at 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_road_ahead_for_capitalism_in_China_1782. 
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another major factor that has contributed to China’s poor IPR 
enforcement is China’s persistent “underutilization” of criminal 
deterrents.  The Special Report stated that China continues to direct 
most of its trademark enforcement to administrative authorities.123  The 
Report concludes that the “[r]ules designed to promote transfer of cases 
to criminal authorities . . . have not solved the problem.”124  Moreover, 
when trademark disputes reach the judicial system, the system fails to 
provide adequate deterrence because the fines imposed on trademark 
infringers are too low.125  Indeed, the amount of the fine for trademark 
infringement is valued by the price of the infringing products on the 
counterfeit market instead of the value of the original mark being 
copied.126  Consequently, it is not surprising that many infringers 
perceive administrative seizures and fines as a cost of doing business, 
making infringement an acceptable loss.127  Finally, many authors have 
argued that the Chinese criminal code is considered rather vague 
because it fails to define what constitutes a counterfeiting crime of a 
“serious nature.”128  Thus, even if the local authorities apply the laws, 
they may simply apply more lenient standards because of their statutory 
ambiguity. 
The current trademark protection and enforcement system in place 
in China has failed to change Chinese behavior patterns that have 
evolved over centuries.  However, it should not be ignored that use of 
China’s judicial system to enforce the protection of trademarks and IPR 
in general is still evolving and cannot be solved overnight.  Regardless 
of criticism and despite serious flaws that continue to exist concerning 
trademark enforcement, China’s trademark system is reasonably 
effective.  Because China is committed to protecting domestic and 
foreign trademark owners, enforcement will be further strengthened. 
II. WHEN CHINESE CULTURE IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO TRADEMARK 
ENFORCEMENT 
The ongoing issue of trademark law enforcement in China ought not 
to be analyzed without addressing China’s cultural roots and heritage as 
 
123.  USTR, supra note 4 at 21.  
124.  Id. 
125.  See Jennifer L. Donatuti, Can China Protect the Olympics or Should the Olympics 
be Protected from China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 217-18 (2007). 
126.  Id. at 218. 
127.  USTR, supra note 4. 
128.  Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges for 
Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 392 (2008). 
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the primary ground for China’s lack of enforcement.129  Indeed, cultural 
factors may explain the poor progress of trademark protection in China 
despite the implementation of new trademark and intellectual property 
laws.130 
The notion of trademark rights, as well as the concept of IPR, is 
relatively new in China.131  For thousands of years, IPR have been 
absent in China’s history even though the Chinese have been creative 
and innovative in many fields.132  Until recently, the protection of 
trademarks and intellectual property in China was not a primary 
concern to the Chinese government.133  Indeed, the adoption of 
trademark laws to protect owners did not come in response to the need 
of the Chinese people to protect their rights.134  Instead, it was triggered 
by the constant pressure and frustration from the U.S. on the Chinese 
government to protect the intellectual property interests of U.S. 
nationals eager to do business in China.  Thus, such concepts remain, to 
some extent, foreign to the Chinese community in which individual 
rights and private property have been overpowered by the interests of 
society.135 
Chinese imperial rulers used Confucian values to legitimize their 
governmental regime and their own authority.136  Regarded by many as 
an ethical code, Confucianism served as a guide to Chinese peoples’ 
behavior from the sixth century B.C. to the middle of the 20th century.137  
The Confucian ideology, which essentially focused on the transmission 
or passing down of intellectual property works for others to build on,138 
 
129.  See Long, supra note 109, at 159. 
130.  See Thomas Tze-Hun Chou, Private Copyright Investment in China, 1 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 375, 393 (1997). 
131.  Hu, supra note 5, at 72-73. 
132.  Tian, supra note 23, at 17. 
133.  Donald P. Harris, Nineteenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Article: The 
Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 96, 103 (2009). 
134.  See Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the Tiger: A Comparison of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the United States and the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 95 (2008). 
135.  See id. 
136.  Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East-Asia: From the Legal 
Culture Perspective, 1 APLPJ 13, 87 (2000). 
137.  Deli Yang, The development of intellectual property in China, WORLD PATENT 
INFORMATION VOL. 25: 131, at 134, available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V5D-48761R7-
1/2/c2ba4aff7e08722ab0ce75499ad69efb 2003.  
138.  L. Montgomery & B. Fitzgerald, Copyright and the creative industries in China 
(2006), INT’L J OF CULTURAL STUD. 2006, 9: 407, at 408.  
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strongly encouraged imitation of teachers as a way of learning, loyalty to 
masters, and subordination of individual interests to the social good.139  
The state and its people believed in “ren min de li yi gao yu yi qie,” that 
is, the peoples’ interest is first.  The family, not the individual, 
constituted the unit of the social and political community.140  Legal 
obligations were attached to the family relationship.141  Conversely, 
Western law regulated private and economic rights and duties of the 
individual.142  Not surprisingly, the notion of private ownership was 
regarded as contrary to socialist community life.143 
Thus, until recently, the Chinese never viewed IPR violations as the 
“taking away” of one’s individual rights.  Instead, sharing, copying, and 
infringing were highly valued within China’s tradition and thus, 
perfectly acceptable.  The emergence of the Chinese Communist Party 
in 1949 furthered such tradition.144  For instance, work products were 
collectively owned by the State for the good of society.  Thus, the State 
served the common good for its people. 
Moreover, although morality and propriety were important in 
Confucianism, they were not regulated by external laws.145  Instead, the 
use of external laws was a strongly disapproved means of governance.146  
Notwithstanding Confucian ideals, external laws were mostly used 
where self-regulation failed to provide an adequate remedy.  For 
centuries, Chinese people who respected the rule of man (ren-zhi), 
rather than the rule of law (fa zhi), viewed lawsuits as bad luck, even 
evil.  Accordingly Confucius’ Analects: 
 
Lead the people with governmental measures and 
regulate them by law and punishments, and they will 
avoid wrong-doing, but will have no sense of honor or 
shame.  Lead them by virtue and regulate them by the 
rules of propriety and they will have a sense of shame, 
and moreover, set themselves right.147 
 
139.  Tian, supra note 23, at 50. 
140.  Shin-yi Peng, supra note 136, at 134. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  See, generally, A. M. Bean, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in China, J. 
INT’L L. & PRAC. 339 (1995). 
144.  Tian, supra note 23, at 50-51. 
145.  Ann Kent, Waiting for Rights: China’s Human Rights and China’s Constitution, 
1949-1989, HUMAN RIGHTS Q., VOL. 13, NO. 2 , May 1991, 170, 174. 
146.  Tze-Hun Chou, supra note 130, at 394. 
147.  WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: 
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Thus, wrongdoing, such as trademark infringement, has not been 
deterred by the risk of facing prison time or paying fines.  Instead, 
wrongdoing has been deterred by the Chinese’s fear of shame and 
dishonor among society.148  Even today, it is not uncommon practice to 
make a public apology as the acceptance of wrongdoing.  Indeed, 
apologies are often ordered by the court in its judgments.149  They are 
generally published in newspapers and other media to eliminate the 
“adverse effect” of the infringement.150  If an infringer fails to apologize 
as ordered, the court may draft and publish an apology instead and 
charge the expense to the wrongdoer.151  The Chinese believe that such 
acknowledgment will create such an embarrassment that it will serve as 
a future deterrent.  In other words, an apology is more like a shaming 
penalty, or the alternative remedy of “eliminating the effects of the 
[infringing] act,” or both.152  Not surprisingly, courts have been ordering 
a public apology in many trademark infringement cases. 
Despite China’s rapid political and economic growth in the recent 
years, the “cultural mores and the laws that reflect them have 
consistently retained a Confucian and Marxist basis of subjugation of 
individual interest to the greater good of society.”153  Consequently, 
many Chinese people consider state laws as the last recourse.154  Thus, 
even today, the Chinese still prefer settling a dispute through an 
informal process. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The United States has constantly put pressure on China to 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 20 (Stanford 
University Press 1997). 
148.  Tze-Hun Chou, supra note 130, at 394. 
149.  Peter K. Yu, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit: Article: From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual 
Property in Post-WTO-China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 953 (2006). 
150.  Id.  
151.  Id.  
152.  Id.  
153.  Aileen M. McGill, “How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic Trademark and 
Why This Success May not Generate Immediate Improvements in Intellectual Property 
Protection in China” LOY. LAW & TECH. ANN. (2010), available at  
http://works.bepress.com/aileen_mcgill/2/; see also Tao-Tai Hsia & Kathryn A. Huan, Laws of 
the People’s Republic of China on Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 LAW & POL’Y INT’ 
L BUS. 743, 750 (1973). 
154.  McGill, supra note 116, at 15 (citing TAN LOKE KHOON, PIRATES IN THE 
MIDDLE KINGDOM: THE ART OF TRADEMARK WAR (2004) at 4-5). 
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implement and enforce new laws to protect trademarks and other type 
of IPRs.  For instance, the United States has been pushing for more 
criminal enforcement to fight against the proliferation of “safe harbors,” 
which have spared Chinese trademark infringers from criminal 
liability.155  Each time, China has responded favorably by adopting and 
amending its existing laws to satisfy the U.S.’s expectations to provide 
tougher protection.  Even more telling, China did so in a very short 
period of time. Yet, China’s efforts have remained unsatisfactory. 
A. From Coercion to Understanding: The United States Should Adopt the 
China-E.U. Model 
It has become obvious that the United States’ coercive policy 
towards trademark and IPR protection in general has been 
miscalculated in obtaining the expected results.156  Since the late 1980s, 
the United States pursued a very aggressive foreign intellectual property 
policy towards China.157  Indeed, it repeatedly threatened China with 
economic sanctions, trade wars, non-renewal of most-favored nation 
status, and opposition to China’s entry into the WTO.158  A prime 
example is the frequent use of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 by 
the United States against China.159  In another instance, negotiations 
seeking active intellectual property enforcement and improved market 
access between the United States and China ended in 1995 when the 
USTR threatened to impose 100 percent tax on 1.08 billion of Chinese 
imports into the United States if enforcement issues were not 
resolved.160  Finally, the United States filed two trade complaints against 
China at the WTO for the deficiency in China’s IPR laws and market 
access barriers to copyright-based industries.161  As a result, the gap 
 
155.  USTR, supra note 4, at 21; see generally Matthew W. Cheney, Trading With the 
Dragon: A Critique of the Use of Sanctions by the United States Against China, 6 JOURNAL OF 
INT’L LAW & PRACTICE 1, 25-26 (1997) (arguing that U.S.’s threats of trade sanctions in 
some way placed the U.S. in a worse position than before sanctions were taken).  
156.  See Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 446. 
157.  Yu, supra note 149, at 934. 
158.  Id. at 999; see Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Issue for Congress, China-U.S. Trade 
Issues, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/41125.pdf (last updated Nov. 
3, 2004). 
159.  USTR, supra note 4. 
160.  Id.   
161.  See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Files 
WTO Cases Against China Over Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws and 
Market Access Barriers to Copyright-Based Industries (Apr. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2007/april/united-states-
files-wto-cases-against-china. 
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between the United States and China has deepened. 
At no time has the United States considered China’s culture as one 
of the major impediments to enforcement of trademark laws in China.  
Thus, despite what the United States may claim, Chinese legislation is 
not necessarily “the root cause”162 of all China’s problems regarding 
legal enforcement.  Instead, the root cause is China’s long-cherished and 
deep-rooted culture.163  Failure to understand Chinese culture will 
inevitably lead to the failure of foreign government attempts, like the 
U.S. government, to enforce trademark laws in China.164  As Jeffrey 
Levine correctly stated: 
 
[E]ffective IPR enforcement lies not exclusively through 
the use of courts, laws, treaties and international 
organizations, but also through the development of 
stakeholders relationships and the incentives they 
engender, the foundation of most mutually beneficial 
business ventures. Using an approach that accounts for 
Chinese cultural norms seems like a more promising 
approach to IPR enforcement as compared to forcing 
adoption of Western legal concepts which lack 
congruency with the Chinese approach to law and 
culture.165 
 
In response to the U.S.’s coercive approach, the Chinese 
government has become more and more reluctant to take the necessary 
measures to meet the trademark protection standards.  This may be 
explained by the lack of mutual trust and understanding between the 
two nations, and the ongoing use of trade threats made by the U.S..  
Thus, the increasing demand made by the U.S. resulted in making the 
Chinese government and its officials more defensive than receptive to 
strengthening its trademark protection regime.166 
While the U.S.’s coercive approach may be arguably effective in 
triggering immediate compliance by the Chinese government, such gains 
have been temporary as they have not been followed by effective 
enforcement.  Indeed, this coercive approach tends to invite 
 
162.   See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 712 
(1994). 
163.  Allison & Lin, supra note 24, at 786. 
164.  Id. 
165.  Levine, supra note 49, at 229.  
166.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 447. 
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retaliation.167  Specifically, in one instance, in response to Washington’s 
refusal to delay its consideration of sanctions against China regarding 
the production of pirated video cassettes and compact disks, China sent 
a deliberate message to Washington, that it had the ability to turn to 
European partners, when it placed an order with France for an 
estimated 1.5 billion dollars worth of Airbus planes, instead of Boeing 
planes as it initially planned.168  Arguably, this shows a preference in 
China towards the EU’s flexible and cooperative approach.  Thus, the 
use of coercion against China as the U.S. dominant tactics has proven to 
be unsuccessful in reducing piracy and trademark infringement.169 
Furthermore, many scholars have denounced the failure of the 
United States’ tactics because of its indifference, whether voluntary or 
not, to the cultural differences it has with China,170 where “notions of 
[IPR] have reflected cultural values, which are inseparable from cultural 
and traditional values.”171  While Americans today treat trademark 
infringement as illegal and punishable as a crime, the Chinese tend to 
treat intellectual sharing as a virtue and normal learning process.  This 
certainly demonstrates that the significance of historical events, social 
norms, and cultural differences can be the major reason for the 
widespread resistance among the Chinese against trademark 
enforcement.  As Scholar J. A. Lehman stated, the heart of the U.S.-
China IPR dispute “is a basic incompatibility between modern western 
views of intellectual property and traditional Chinese ethical and social 
thought.”172 
Thus, by disregarding China’s historical and cultural attributes, U.S. 
policymakers have fundamentally misunderstood the capabilities of the 
current power structure and enforcement mechanisms.  “While concepts 
 
167.  See SCOTT FAIRLEY, EXTRATERRITORIAL ASSERTIONS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE,  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR 
A BALANCED SYSTEM 141, 144 (George R. Stewart et al. eds. 1994) (“unilateralism 
begats unilateralism”). 
168.  See Craig R. Whitney, China Awards Huge Jet Order to Europeans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 11, 1996, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/11/world/china-awards-
huge-jet-order-to-europeans.html?pagewanted=1. 
169.  See Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC 
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 334-35 (2006). 
170.  Alford, supra note 147, at 19-22.  
171.  Seung-Hwan Mun, A New Approach to U.S. Copyright Policy against Piracy in 
China, at 3, available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/1/1/8/5/pages111851/p11185
1-2.php (last visited March 5, 2011). 
172.  John Allen Lehman, Intellectual Property Rights and Chinese Tradition Section: 
Philosophical Foundation, J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2006). 
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of intellectual property law might be fully understandable to westerners, 
many Chinese people view and understand them differently.”173  
Meanwhile, China’s efforts to improve and enforce its intellectual 
property regime, while trying simultaneously to stem trademark 
infringement and other counterfeiting activities, must not be 
overlooked.174  Thus, U.S. businesses that have the desire to expand their 
operations in China, while in need to protect their trademarks, will first 
be required to appreciate the Chinese culture. 
Furthermore, the United States, which has valued the rights of 
intellectual property owners and their individual freedom for more than 
two-hundred years, should acknowledge two things: first, China only 
recognized IPR during the last twenty-years; second, China passed its 
intellectual property laws before it developed a sense of intellectual 
property rights among its nationals. 
Finally, because U.S. policymakers have incorrectly assumed that 
Western concepts of property rights have been universally accepted,175 
they wrongly believed that the mere exercise of external pressure would 
improve trademark protection in China.  Not surprisingly, the Chinese 
government proved them wrong.  The United States’ tactics did not 
yield substantial improvement in trademark protection and enforcement 
in China.176  Instead, it yielded hostility and discontentment. 
The United States should recognize that the Chinese government 
has made a concerted effort to raise public awareness among its 
nationals of the importance of protecting both domestic and foreign 
trademark by addressing China’s cultural perceptions.177  A prime 
example of Chinese national achievement is the 2008 Olympics Games, 
which have strengthened the Chinese’s public awareness for the societal 
benefits of stronger trademark protection.  Indeed, China used the 
Olympics to educate the public about trademark rights.  Through the 
2008 Olympics Games, China has proven that it can bridge the cultural 
disconnect and demonstrated to its domestic business community that 
global economic success is tied to effective trademark enforcement.178  
With the opening of the 2010 World Exposition in Shanghai on April 30, 
 
173.  Birden, supra note 88, at 494. 
174.  Id. 
175.  William P. Alford, How Theory Does—And Does Not—Matter: American 
Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 8, 17 
(1994). 
176.  Id. 
177.  Tian, supra note 23. 
178.  See Levine, supra note 49. 
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2010, China will continue to educate its nationals with respect to 
trademarks and prove to the outside world that it has the ability to 
protect trademarks within its borders.  In addition, China has started to 
construct better infra-structures, institutions, and capacities.179  Foreign 
educated Chinese are returning home, bringing with them western 
business knowledge, technical know-how, cultural experience, and 
personal contacts.180  Furthermore, educating the public about 
intellectual property and providing adequate training to lawyers and 
judges on the principles of law governing the protection of trademarks 
will take some time.  China is gradually making changes to shift the 
Party’s ideology to value trademark and IPR in general while 
responding to international pressure from the United States.  China can 
certainly implement harsher penalties and establish effective relations 
between the administrative and judicial bodies that are currently in 
place to apply and enforce trademark laws on both the national and 
local levels.  Again, China’s current progress should not be overlooked.  
China’s achievements over two decades in protecting trademark and 
IPR in general have taken hundreds of years in some other nations.181  
“Educating people takes time and patience, especially a people as 
diverse and well-entrenched in their beliefs as the Chinese.”182 
Thus, in order to protect a trademark owner’s trademark rights in 
China, U.S. officials should remember these cultural differences183 and 
account for Confucian ideology and Chinese societal norms when 
negotiating with Chinese officials with respect to trademark 
enforcement.  To promote “real” progress in trademark protection, the 
U.S. will have to change an entire nation’s societal and cultural 
behaviors towards intellectual property.  Thus, instead of exercising 
further pressure on China, U.S. officials should engage in a “deeper 
dialogue” with China and try understanding China’s traditional culture 
and history. 
 
179.  Hu, supra note 5, at 119-20. 
180.  See ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY- THE RISING CHINESE 
ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF 
POWER AND YOUR JOB 575 (Wharton School Publishing 2005).  An estimated 160,000 
Chinese students went abroad in 2002.  The “turtles as they are called in China to denote the 
tendency of the species to return to its birthplace could play a key role in China’s 
technological transformation. 
181.  Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy: Analysis of the Problems and 
Suggestions for Protection of U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT’L. L. 599, 605 (1995).  
182.  Birden, supra note 88, at 494. 
183.  Richard J. Ansson Jr., International Intellectual Property Rights, the United States, 
and the People’s Republic of China, 13 TEMP. INT’L  & COMP. L. J. 1, 24 (1999). 
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B. China- EU Relationship: A Model Approach 
The United States’ tactics to provide trademark protection to its 
nationals in China provides a good illustration of “what has been tried 
and failed.”184 
Conversely, China and the European Union have maintained a 
harmonious relationship and thus should serve as a model in 
strengthening the relationship between China and the U.S. European 
companies have not been immune from infringement due to the lack of 
proper trademark protection in China. As a fact, many of these 
companies lobbied European institutions to initiate trade sanctions 
against China.185  However, unlike the China-U.S. relationship, China 
and the European Union have maintained a more friendly relationship 
on both political and economic levels.186  The dominant trend has been 
to favor and strengthen bilateral cooperation with respect to IPR 
protection.187 
Over the past years, the EU and China have built a remarkable 
collaboration to protect IPR in China188 by engaging in a series of 
negotiations to promote the development and enforcement of 
trademark laws in China and intellectual property in general.  For 
instance, both nations held their first EU-China Annual Summit 
(“Annual Summit”) in London in 1998.189  The purpose of the Annual 
Summit has been to maintain current progress made by both nations 
regarding IPR protection.190  Specifically, in the course of the Eighth 
Annual Summit in Beijing, in September 2005,191 Chinese and European 
leaders emphasized the need to implement and enforce intellectual 
 
184.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 447. 
185.  Id. at 448. 
186.  Id. at 452. 
187.  The EU Ambassador to China, Mr. Serge Abou, commented on March 7, 2007 in 
a press conference held in Shanghai, “the trade conflict between the EU and China is 
inappreciable, as a small tree in a dense forest, and a strengthened cooperation is the 
mainstream.” 
188.  WEI SHI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING 
SYSTEM: EU-CHINA PERSPECTIVE 235 (2008).  
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. at 235-36.  
191.  Joint Statement of the 8th EU-China Summit, at art 4 (Sept. 5, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1091&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see The Commission of the European Communities, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 24 
October 2006, EU-China: closer partners, growing responsibilities, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/asia
/r14208_en.htm. 
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property laws while protecting the interests of consumers and creating a 
positive business environment for continued growth and protection.  
Most recently, at the Twelfth Annual Summit in Nanjing, in November 
2009, leaders of both sides applauded the achievements in the 
development of bilateral relations and agreed that a political mutual 
trust is enhancing their continued support for each other’s peaceful and 
sustainable development.192  Both sides further agreed to stay committed 
to the strategic nature of the EU-China relationship and pledged to seek 
greater development based on mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit, 
openness, and win-win cooperation.193  Additionally, the EU and China 
launched the EU-China Intellectual Property Rights Cooperation 
Programme (“the EU-China Programme”) in 1998.194  The main goal of 
the EU-China Programme was to promote bilateral trade by fostering 
China’s commitment to develop an effective system for the protection of 
trademarks and intellectual property in general.195  The EU-China 
Programme, which was managed by the European Patent Office, 
included the training judges and attorneys of administrative 
enforcement, public awareness, border enforcement, as well as 
conducting  seminars and workshops in Beijing and in the provinces.196  
Another mechanism in place to ensure IPR protection and enforcement 
in China is the EU-China Intellectual Property Dialogue (“IDP”).  The 
IDP, launched in 2003, provides a structured annual dialogue between 
the European Commission and China.  During the 2007 IDP, the EU 
and China discussed the issue of “cleaning out retail and wholesale 
markets” that sell counterfeits and pirated goods, and China expressed 
“satisfaction.”197 
One of the factors that helps understand the relationship between 
the European Union and China is the ongoing support, rather than 
constant criticism, that the EU has expressed toward the Chinese 
government.  For instance, Chinese cultural features have been 
accepted and understood by the EU for more than two thousand 
 
192.  Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit (Nov. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/111567.pdf  
193.  Id.  
194.  Shi, supra note 189, at 237.  
195.  See EU-China Project on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China 
(IPR2), http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/interntional-relations/project/eu-china.html (last 
visited March 24, 2011). 
196.  Id.  
197.  See Outcome of the Third Meeting of the EU-China IP Dialogue, Brussels 15-16 
March 2007, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/may/tradoc_134658.pdf p 
2 (2007). 
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years.198  Thus, China and Europe have been able to develop and 
maintain a close rapport despite their different values.  Both nations 
have strived to understand each other by privileging communication and 
collaboration.  Even more telling, the EU has been willing to adopt a 
long-term tactical approach regarding trademark protection in China 
because it has accepted that counterfeiting and piracy are common 
problems in developing countries such as China.  By doing so, the EU 
has acknowledged China’s culture, which in turn has resulted in a better 
understanding between China and Europe.  According to Peter 
Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, the EU “has accepted that 
IPR is a complex issue and that China’s commercial culture and legal 
system need time to absorb change.”199  Moreover, although substantial 
work is still required, the EU and China have made several encouraging 
institutional arrangements, including the establishment of the EU-
Intellectual Property Dialogue.  In contrast, the United States has been 
using Section 301 constantly in fighting counterfeiting and piracy, 
without giving much credit to China’s economic adaptation and cultural 
tradition.  Furthermore, many of the U.S.-China bilateral agreements 
pertaining to trademark and IPR protections in general were the result 
of a coercive U.S. policy that aimed at imposing trade sanctions upon 
China. 
Moreover, while the United States overtly expressed its opposition 
to China’s fast entry into the WTO, the EU has been most supportive of 
China’s WTO membership. Indeed, despite the so-called “China 
threat,” the EU has viewed China’s rapid economic growth as a unique 
opportunity.200  Some authors argue that the EU’s position may be partly 
understood because the absence of China’s growth would be considered 
a greater threat to global affairs.201  While this may be true, the EU’s 
relationship with China is based on greater tolerance, which has proven 
to be a better approach to address trademark enforcement in China 
than the U.S.-China model. 
The U.S.’s external pressure upon China definitely led to the 
implementation of new trademark laws; however, it is the understanding 
of China’s culture that will help influence Chinese attitudes towards IPR 
in general.  Thus, the U.S. should learn from the EU and adopt a more 
 
198.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 448. 
199.  Peter Mandelson, Protecting IPR in China, Speech at Trade Fairs Seminar- 
Beijing (Nov. 26, 2007), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/751&type=HTML. 
200.  Shi & Weatherley, supra note 3, at 450. 
201.  See id. 
HOOVER - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:04 PM 
354  MARQUETTE I.P. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:2 
 
lenient approach so that it can cultivate and maintain a long-term 
relationship based on the understanding of China’s unique culture. 
With regard to international IPR, the U.S. policy seems to have 
somewhat influenced political considerations.  For instance, the recent 
WTO complaints against China under the Bush administration may be a 
response to reduce the trade deficit with China, which amounts to 268 
billion dollars.202  Because of such deficit, the White House appealed 
vigorously to intensifying anti-China “sentiments” in Congress203 with 
respect to bilateral trade deficits with China by lobbying several 
economic sanctions.  In comparison, although the EU suffered a trade 
deficit with China, the Europeans, unlike the Americans, blamed the 
deficit to the obstacle in market access in China and believe that such 
deficit would be reduced if China were to further open its markets.204 
The cultivation of valuable business relationships with the Chinese is 
often a long-term process that requires a great deal of patience.205  
Despite the current threat of trademark infringement in China, this is 
the approach that the European Union has decided to adopt.  This is 
also the approach the United States should adopt to promote trademark 
protection in China.  The EU has correctly acknowledged that an 
understanding of Chinese culture facilitates relationship-building and 
can help trademark protection in China.  Thus, the United States should 
adopt the China-EU model in its fight against trademark violations in 
China. 
CONCLUSION 
This article offers no easy answer to trademark enforcement in 
China.  However, it points out the need to address trademark protection 
in China within the Chinese cultural and socio-economic setting.  In the 
past several years, China’s ability to protect trademark and IPR in 
general has dramatically risen under the pressure of the United States.  
China is taking intellectual property concerns very seriously and is 
aware that more needs to be achieved.  As the United States has 
learned, attempts to make rapid and fundamental changes, such as those 
aimed at enforcing trademark laws in China, are destined to fail.  Thus, 
 
202.  See US-China Business Council, US-China Trade Facts, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china (last visited March 10, 2010). 
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emphasis should be made on long-term goals. 
To solve the trademark and IPR enforcement issues in the long run, 
China will continue to educate its people and help them adjust views 
and attitudes towards IPR.  As of today, the change in Chinese culture 
is at a slow pace.206  It is only when Chinese people understand the 
impact and need of IPR protection and become stakeholders of IPR 
that they will be willing to change their attitudes and support IPR 
protection.  Meanwhile, the United States should be more sensitive to 
Chinese cultural and social conventions and seek creative solutions to 
enforce trademark in China, rather than forcing solutions on the 
Chinese that do not fit China’s cultural context.207  While China will 
undoubtedly encounter problems along the way, as it already has, its 
efforts to combat trademark violations should be credited.  Because 
China will continue to attract foreign business, it can be expected that 
China will live up to the terms of its commitment and will do whatever it 
can to enforce its existing trademark laws. 
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